Ohhh Eym Gee..: A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL

Ohhh Eym Gee..: A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL: In love. Still in love with a guy whose heart does not contain my name anymore.             Our love was a “hot and cold” love. It beca...

A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL

In love. Still in love with a guy whose heart does not contain my name anymore.

            Our love was a “hot and cold” love. It became hot when we are in each other’s arms then cold when he’s far away. We live in a same town. I knew him back when I was a high school student because I often saw him making fun with his friends who are fortunately my acquaintances in our neighborhood. However, that time, I don’t have any feelings towards him. I don’t even know his name. He is just a tall, skinny, and playful guy.

            When I finished my secondary education, I decided to pursue my college degree in Iloilo. I enjoyed my stay there and developed a relationship that I thought would last for a lifetime with a marine guy. But God never favored it and we ended our relationship after three years. I thought I would not be able to recuperate my heart for a long time but.. surprise!, I became cheerful again after two to three weeks.

            It was mid-November 2010 when someone tried to converse with me through Facebook. To my surprise, he was the same guy in our town. At first, I don’t want to be his friend because he had the same course with my recent “ex”. I tried to avoid him as much as possible until he stopped communicating with me. I felt relief.

            But..

            He started contacting me after five months.

            I really don’t want to talk with him! But he keeps on insisting to have little talks with me until I decided to give him a chance. After all, we’re of the same town and adding a new friend on my list is not actually a bad idea. It started with small talks over the phone (because he is studying in Davao that time and I am also preparing myself to enter law school) until it became a routine of 11pm to 6am. Would you believe that? Haha.. But it’s true. We never talked about love, commitments, and courtship. It’s anything under the heat of the sun. I really saw him as my smart friend.

            Until, he started opening his heart to me. He told me that, unexpectedly, he fell in love with me. I was speechless. I was verbally constipated. Haha.. But, I don’t have feelings for him! I don’t want to lose a special friend. He matters. He courted me for two years. He patiently waited for me for a long time. But that two years was my chance to see his other side. He is so thoughtful. He never failed to contact me when he got a chance. At that time, he was completing his “On the Job Training” in a how many nautical miles. I never met him in person for that whole two years but was able to meet his family.

Until the day comes when we met for my panel interview where I was accepted as a law student..

I said, yes!

I fall in love with a marine guy.. AGAIN.

Things became hotter and happier. I felt love and care.

Until he came back from his school to finish his studies..

Things became colder and sadder. I felt hate and neglect.

Things became different. He rarely talks with me. Reasons were he was busy or tired or sleepy then next thing I know, he became a different person. I don’t know him anymore. Gone is the guy I talked with a couple of hours until the rooster crows in the morning. Gone is the guy who took great effort to make me smile. At first, I became a fool. I am blinded by love. I made efforts to salvage our love. But it’s hopeless when the other party does not appreciate your effort. I never thought our love became messy. I was contented and confident that our love has a strong foundation. Or so I thought. It became a one-sided love affair.

After 27 months, I decided to let him go. I realized that I am a girl who doesn’t deserve being an OPTION. It hurts! People said that it is more hurtful when a person you love broke up with you. But why does it feel so wrong? I let him go. I broke up with him! But why am I that person who feels this excruciating pain? I’ve been hurting myself for two years already. In fact, I’ve been hurting since the day I felt his love starting to fade. I love him so much that I let him go because he is not happy with me anymore. I can feel it. Every. Single. Day.

I decided to divert my attention to many activities. I tried everything so that I could forget him even for a moment. I have been asking God for help. To stop this madness. To stop this pain. I became dependent with God because I know He is my Great Comforter but why does my mind comes to our memories?

You know what’s the most crucial part of being in silence? That’s when I saw him crying before we broke up. Why did he even bother to cry? I let him go. He should be happy! Footspa naman o! What’s his reason for crying? Is it because he betrayed me? Is it because he can’t let me go but he had to for he doesn’t want to see me hurt anymore? Or am I that one who hurt him? Or am I that one who doesn’t understand him? There are so many questions that still linger in my head. I always end up thinking why he cried that day before he said that he loves me but he had to let me go, too. I still remember that last kiss he gave me, those tears he shed for me, those pain in his eyes, those hugs that trembles and unsure, and those fake smiles that gave me hint that he already left me a long time ago..

But, I f*cking love him so much. So damn much that I don’t want to see him anymore!

I am hurting but he is smiling.

I am struggling but he is still smiling.

I was the reason behind his smiles before until he can only force his smiles. Then, later on, I am not the one who could make him smile anymore.

I wish he knows how I can still manage to survive here after he broke me into pieces. I wish he sees what he did to me. I wish he did not approach me when in the end, he just left me.

God knows I’ve done so hard to forget him but he never left my system. Fool. Stupid. Weak. Helpless. Shattered.

Too. Much. Pain.

Someone, save me. Please.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: DBP VS. CASTILLO (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 163827 August 17, 2011

MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.

If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012

OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: BARITUA VS MERCADER (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 136048 January 23, 2001

DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION

Generally. the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: BAGUNU VS. AGGABAO (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 186487                                   August 15, 2011

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Under this doctrine, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPUBLIC VS ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 192975                         November 12, 2012

HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 190107                             June 6, 2011

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED

As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: FELIX VS. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 143736                           August 11, 2004

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED

The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons on him, wither by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: ATTY. CABILI VS. JUDGE BALINDONG (Jurisprudence)

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225                        September 6, 2011

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY

This doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (Jurisprudence)

G.R. No. 142628                      February 6, 2007

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

The Supreme Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.

CIVIL PROCEDURE: PEOPLE VS. AZARRAGA (Jurisprudence)

G.R. Nos. 187117 and 187127                   October 12, 2011

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from the Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would be an inevitably result in delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

FAYPON VS QUIRINO

G.R. No. L-7068                             December 22, 1954

FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.

RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

GALLEGO VS VERRA

G.R. No. L-48641                                  November 24, 1941

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.

Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.

DUMLAO, ET AL. VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52245                                January 22, 1980

FACTS:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and has been receiving retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides that retirees from public office are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer's suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars person charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged. Dumlao's issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different issues. Further, this case does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

PAMIL VS TELERON

G.R. No. L-34854                         November 20, 1978

FACTS:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of the latter. He argued that under the Revised Administrative Code, "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RAC is no longer operative.

RULING:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of 8 which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.

Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.

VILAR VS. PARAISO

G.R. No. L-8014                      March 14, 1955

FACTS:

Vilar and Paraiso were candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was made, Paraiso was declared as the mayor duly elected. However, Vilar instituted a present quo warranto proceedings before the tial court contending that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of UCCP and that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place. The lower court favored Vilar but stated that the latter could not be declared as mayor. Both parties appealed before the CA. However, the court elevated it to the Supreme Court because of the conflicting issues between Vilar and Paraiso.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that Paraiso never ceased as minister and that the resignation he claimed to have filed before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. If the respondent intended to resign as minister of the religious organization for the purpose of launching his candidacy, he should resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation. who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to so. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.

The documents Paraiso presented to show his alleged resignation were held to be self-serving and appeared to have been prepared haphazardly, leading the court to believe that these were made only to cure his ineligibility to hold office.

ROYALES VS IAC

G.R. No. L-65072                  January 31, 1984

FACTS:

Sought to be annulled in this petition for review is a final and executory judgment rendered by the City Court [now Metropolitan Trial Court] of Manila in Civil Case No. 057662-CV on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Jose Planas, plaintiff therein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process before the filing of the case in court, as required by P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law."

RULING: 
In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay conciliation process is a pre-condition for the filing of an action in court. There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact, respondent Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this condition precedent. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; 1 but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.

FELIZARDO VS CA

G.R. No. 112050                       June 15, 1994

FACTS: 

The petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support his prayer for a preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 3 for prior barangay conciliation.

ISSUE:

Whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

RULING:

Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides:  

Sec. 412. Conciliation. — 

(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: 

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

GALUBA VS LAURETA

G.R. No. 71091          January 29, 1988

FACTS:

The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul an amicable settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of the Lupong Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of said amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1508.

RULING: 

Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also provides that "[f]ailure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.

Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising from said settlement. It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said law, "[t]he amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of the ten [10] days from the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court." 

Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for the annulment of an amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has repudiated the settlement in accordance with Section 13 as Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified, however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration award pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement.

PONSICA VS IGNALAGA

G.R. No. 72301               July 31, 1987

FACTS:

The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local Government Code1granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and order the arrest of the accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by this Court; and is, in addition, unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct preliminary investigations in an official who cannot be deemed a "neutral and detached magistrate" within the contemplation of Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The issue is hereby resolved adversely to the petitioners, with the stressed qualification that the mayor's power to order arrest ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the new Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people, and that, in any event, the investigation actually conducted by respondent mayor in the case at bar was fatally defective.

RULING: 

While it is true that the mayors do "exercise general supervision over units and elements of the INP stationed or assigned in their respective jurisdictions," they are not themselves directly involved in police work and cannot in any sense be described, as the petitioners do, as being deeply involved in law enforcement functions. And even if that "deep involvement" be conceded, it does not follow that this would necessarily preclude their assuming "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in conducting preliminary investigations of persons suspected of crimes.

As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority to do so being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (2) judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and regional state prosecutors; and (d) such other officers as may be authorized by law. But only "the judge" may issue search and arrest warrants after due determination of probable cause.

SWITZER VS CEBU

G.R. No. 6329           September 1, 1911

FACTS: 

Appellant contends that the expression king of buildings, employed in the legal provision just quoted, includes not only the material of which they are to be composed but also the style; that is (so he concludes), that it empowers the municipalities to prescribed by means of an ordinance the material that may be used in a building constructed within the fire limits, and the style, whether it shall be a warehouse or a dwelling house, and if the latter, whether it shall have one, two, or three stories, as all this may enter into the expression kind of buildings, employed in subsection (f) of section 39 of the Municipal Code.

RULING: 

In the present case, which deals with a building intended for warehouses and storerooms in a place especially given over to loading and discharging the steamers that call at the port of Cebu, we do not regard it at all reasonable to require that such building have more than one story or display a special and prescribed style of ornamentation. Moreover, the commercial interests or purposes which should unquestionably prevail in the location mentioned do not, in our opinion, require such a thing, nor would they probably secure greater benefit therefrom. Keeping in mind also that the building mentioned fulfills the conditions reasonably necessary for security, healthfulness, and hygiene, as stated in the judgment appealed from, we believe that the municipal council of Cebu, in the case before us, for it is not our intention to lay down a general rule for all cases, has no right to oppose or to prohibit the construction of said building, and therefore the judgment appealed from must on this definite ground be affirmed in its principal part.

LIM VS CA

G.R. No. 111397                        August 12, 2002

FACTS:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993,4 issued by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court’s orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity).

RULING: 

The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads: Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be:

x x x.

(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:

"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:

(3) x x x.

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditionupon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)

From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.

BAGASAO VS TUMANGAN

G.R. No, L-10772                         December 29, 1958

FACTS:

 The petitioners are the minority members, and the respondent is the president, of the Municipal Board City of Cabanatuan. They allege in their petition in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija that pursuant to section 14, article III, Republic Act No. 526 commonly known as the Charter of the City of Cabanatuan, five affirmative votes are necessary for the passage of any ordinance, or of any resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability; that the present rules of the Municipal Board as amended shall govern the proceedings of the Board until further amended or revised (Annex B); that pursuant to section 6, Rule XV, Ordinance No. 1, series of 1952 (Annex A), "In case of tie, the President shall vote or may vote to break the tie;" that in the consideration of a proposed ordinance to revise the rate of market fees of the City of Cabanatuan, the respondent "is bent on casting his vote even in the absence of a tie," contrary to the rule referred to, thereby bringing about a situation which calls for a judicial declaration as to the correct meaning or construction of the rule; and that as there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law which could prevent the respondent from violating the rule.

RULING: 

Both the unamended and amended provisions of section 11 of the Charter of the City of Cabanatuan provide that the presiding officer of the Municipal Board is a member thereof. The charter, however, is silent on whether the presiding officer may vote as a member on any proposed ordinance, resolution or motion, or only in case of a tie, or after voting as a member, may, as presiding officer, again vote in case of a tie. Section 6, Rule XV, of the rules of procedure of the Municipal Board (Ordinance No. 1, series of 1952, Annex A, pp. 5-6, record on appeal), merely provides that "In case of tie, the President shall vote or may vote to break the tie." In the cities of Manila and Bacolod, where the Vice-Mayor is a member and the presiding officer of the Municipal Board and City Council, and in the different municipalities, where the Municipal Mayor is the presiding officer of the Municipal Council, such presiding officer may vote only in case of tie by express provision of law, 2in contrast to Quezon City where the Mayor is a member of the City Council, and "the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the City Council" is necessary to pass an ordinance, resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability.

As the presiding officer of the Municipal Board of the City of Cabanatuan is a member thereof, duly elected by popular vote, he may exercise his right to vote as a member on any proposed ordinance, resolution or motion. To limit his right to vote to a case of deadlock or tie would curtail his right and prerogative as a member of the Municipal Board which is not authorized by the provisions of the charter.

FACUNDO VS PABALAN

G.R. No. L-17746                    January 31, 1962

FACTS:

On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669) against respondents Leonardo Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Tiburcio Layos, Federico Domingo, Roberto Lopez, Mariano de los Trinos, Bartolome Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Vicente Perez (municipal treasurer) alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents

 municipal councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and that four days later, respondent mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry clerk.

RULING: 

There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly providing otherwise (Castillo v. Pajo, et al., G. R. No. L-11262, prom. April 28, 1958, citing Brillo v. Enage, 50 O. G. 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will intervene (Gacho, et al. v. Osmena, et al., G. R. No. L-10989, prom. May 28, 1959, citing 37 Am. Jur. 858).

In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting. Resolution No. 67 dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of appellant are stated therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk" in said office; and if abolished, the remaining positions in said office "will be sufficient to warrant the sound operation of said office". In respondents' answer, it is also stated that the appropriation for said position "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order, which have been unduly neglected in the past." Observe too, that the new positions created (in Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67) are those of policemen, the duties of which, are entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to declare that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez v. Montinola, G.R. No. L-5689, prom. May 14, 1954).

ARAO VS. LUSPO

G.R. No. L-23982                         July 21, 1967

FACTS:

Resolutions Nos. 62 and/or 63 of the municipal council of Mambajao, Camiguin subprovince, Misamis Oriental, dated August 2, 1960, abolished the position of municipal clerk in the Mayor's office in said municipality, effective August 3, 1960, premising the same on reasons of economy. Domingo Arao, the occupant of said position since January 4, 1952, moved for reconsideration with said council. Said motion was however considered dropped when Arao failed to appear at a subsequent date fixed for him to be heard. Aside from this, Arao complained to the Civil Service Commissioner, alleging that the municipal council removed him from office in violation of his right under the Constitution to security of tenure as a civil service eligible holding a permanent appointment.  

RULING: 

Appellant's clerical position, was within the power of the municipal council to create, and was also within its power to abolish, provided the exercise of said power is not used as a subterfuge to cover removal from office without cause of a civil service employee.* Abolition of the position in good faith is not removal, so the Constitutional provision, Sec. 4, Art. XII, providing that removal of employees in the civil service be only for cause, does not apply. Such is the situation herein. Petitioner not only failed to prove that personal or political reasons were behind the abolition of his position; the fact that reasons of economy alone were what prompted the abolition, has been fully substantiated.

MANGUBAT VS VILLEGAS

G.R. No. L-28141               March 16, 1988

FACTS:

Valentina de la Paz authorized the herein respondent, Dominador Barredo, to occupy the said stall for her and even executed an affidavit in favor of Dominador Barredo, passing her right over said market stall to her grandson, Dominador Barredo. In the meantime, the Mayor's Office was asked to intervene in this case, and upon proper investigation, the Mayor decided that the herein petitioner could not qualify to occupy said stall because her daughter, unmarried, and living with petitioner, was already the registered holder of several market stalls in the same market. And under the provisions of Section 20 of the Market Code, the petitioner is disqualified to further apply for possession of another stall.

RULING: 

We agree with the court insofar as it denies the petitioner the right to succeed as stallholder following her mother's death. As found by the court, the petitioner was, at the time of the controversy, already a stallholder in the same market. She is, hence, disqualified from holding another stall whether by right of succession or pursuant to a bid. This is provided by Section 13 of the Market Code.

We however, reverse the court insofar as it sustains the private respondent's claim over the game stall. For clearly, the private respondent is not one of those granted the right to succeed a deceased stallholder.

RODRIGUEZ VS MONTINOLA

G.R. No. L-5689                   May 14, 1954

FACTS:

This is an original action of certiorari instituted in this Court by the Provincial Governor ad the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution No. 55 dated January 30, 1952, abolishing the positions of three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the provincial treasurer and the district auditor from paying the salaries of three special counsel from February 1, 1952, and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the functions incident to their positions.

RULING: 

The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial governments, which are distinct and separate. If any power of general supervision is given him over local governments, certainly it can not be understood to mean or to include the right to direct action or even to control action, as in cases of school superintendents or supervisors within their respective districts. Such power (of general supervision) may include correction of violations of law, or of gross errors, abuses, offenses, or maladministration. Unless the acts of local officials or provincial governments constitute maladministration, or an abuse or violation of a law , the power of general supervision can not be exercised. In synthesis, we hold that the power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or hisalter ego, the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties.

BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 139813                 January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.

RULING: 

In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.

We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.28 Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government

GALAROSA VS. VALENCIA

G.R. No. 109455               November 11, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Raul A. Galarosa (hereinafter GALAROSA) is the incumbent president of the katipunang bayan or Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) 1 of the municipality of Sorsogon, province of Sorsogon, and was appointed as a member of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the quondam local government code. The salient issue in this case is whether or not GALAROSA can continue to serve as a member of the SB beyond 30 June 1992, the date when the term of office of the elective members of the SB of Sorsogon expired. The respondent Judge ruled that GALAROSA could not; GALAROSA thinks otherwise and asks us to set aside the decision of the court a quo.

RULING: 

Section 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides for the ex officio membership in the respective sanggunians of the duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipality, city, and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metro Manila. The liga referred to therein is the liga ng mga barangay. Section 491 of the Code provides for its creation and purpose:

Sec. 491. Purpose of organization. — There shall be an organization of all barangays to be known as the Liga ng mga Barangay for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians and for ventilating, articulating, and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

Every barangay is represented in the liga ng mga barangay by the punong barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sanggunian member duly elected for the purpose among its members. 16 The principal aim of theliga ng mga barangay is to promote the development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.

EXO MEMBERS PROFILE

I have been a fan of EXO since 2012. Yes, I am an EXO-L! Ke ke ke ~ They already caught my attention even before their debut because of their individual teasers. I had even memorized their birthdays and (publicly) celebrate it! Although problems arise (originally their group is composed of 12 members but 3 Chinese members left the group), I still keep loving them everyday because I can see their efforts and passion towards their crafts. EXO is my forever bias in K-pop music industry.

Below are individual profiles of OT9:
NOTE: Source of facts are thoroughly searched in many sites.

SUHO

Facts:
Stage name: Suho
Role in EXO: Leader, Vocals

Trivia:
Real name: Kim Joonmyun
Nickname (given by his members): Sunnouncer, Esuhort, Jun Mahao
Birthday: May 22, 1991
Birthplace: Seoul, South Korea
Zodiac: Gemini
Height: 173 cm
Weight: 65 kg
Blood type: AB
Super power (MAMA era): Water
Food: Sushi
Number: 8
Color: Violet, Gold
Music: Punk Rock
Movie: Pirates of the Caribbean
Motto: "Know yourself."
Fashion style: Dandy style
Role Model: Super Junior, TVXQ
Close celebrities: Shinee's Jonghyun, Taemin, Minho; Super Junior's Leeteuk, Donghae, Kyuhyun

SEHUN

Facts:
Stage name: Sehun
Role in EXO: Maknae, Lead Dancer, Rap

Trivia:
Real name: Oh Sehun
Nickname (given by his members): Senshine, Sehunnie, White Skin
Birthday: April 12, 1994
Birthplace: Seoul, South Korea
Zodiac: Aries
Height: 181 cm
Weight: 63.5 kg
Blood type: O
Super power (MAMA era): Wind
Food: Gogi and Sushi
Number: 3, 5, 7
Color: White, Black
Music: Hiphop
Movie: Action movies
Motto: "Let's live while doing things we like!"
Fashion style: Casual
Role Model: BoA
Close celebrities: Super Junior's Donghae

KAI

Facts:
Stage name: Kai
Role in EXO: Visual, Main Dancer, Vocals, Rap,

Trivia:
Real name: Kim Jongin
Nickname (given by his members): Kkamjong, Dark skin
Birthday: January 14, 1994
Birthplace: Seoul, South Korea
Zodiac: Capricorn
Height: 182cm
Weight: 65 kg
Blood type: A
Super power (MAMA era): Teleportation
Food: Fried chicken
Number: 1
Color: Black, Red, Sky Blue
Music: R&B, Hiphop
Movie: Billy Elliot, Pirates of the Caribbean
Motto: "I'd rather bend than break."
Fashion style: Dandy and neat style, Character T-shirts
Role Model: Michael Jackson
Close celebrities: Shinee's Taemin

D.O.

Facts:
Stage name: D.O.
Role in EXO: Lead vocals, Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: D.O. Kyungsoo
Nickname (given by his members): Heenjabuja (rich in white), Umma, Orchestra Boy, The Pop Out Eyes, Pororo
Birthday: January 12, 1993
Birthplace: Goyang, Gyeonggi Province, South Korea
Zodiac: Capricorn
Height: 173 cm
Weight: 60 kg
Blood type: A
Super power (MAMA era): Strenght/Beast
Hobby: Interpreting lyrics
Food: Spaghetti
Number: 1
Color: Black
Music: Pop
Movie: Fantasy movies
Motto: "Be number one."
Fashion style: Casual
Role Model: Yoo Young Jin (composer)
Close celebrities: BtoB's Lim Hyunsik

CHANYEOL

Facts:
Stage name: Chanyeol
Role in EXO: Main Rapper, Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: Park Chanyeol
Nickname (given by his members): Wealthy Teeth, Happy Virus, King of Derps, Chancing Machine (in Weekly Idol)
Birthday: November 27, 1992
Birthplace: Seoul, South Korea
Zodiac: Sagittarius
Height: 185 cm
Weight: 70 kg
Blood type: A
Super power (MAMA era): Fire (Phoenix)
Hobby: Beatboxing, Composing songs, Playing instruments
Food: Galbi, Tonkatsu
Number: 21
Color: Black
Music: Hiphop, Rap
Movie: School of Rock
Motto: "Enjoy yourself."
Fashion style: Street, Hiphop
Role Model: Jason Mraz, Eminem
Close celebrities: TVXQ's U-Know, Super Junior's Siwon

CHEN

Facts:
Stage name: Chen
Role in EXO: Lead Vocals, Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: Kim Jongdae/ Jin Zhong Da
Nickname (given by his members): Chen Chen, Orange, Chencing Machine (in Weekly Idol)
Birthday: September 21, 1992
Birthplace: South Korea
Zodiac: Virgo
Height: 173 cm
Weight: 64 kg
Blood type: B
Super power (MAMA era): Lightning
Hobby: Playing piano
Food: Lamb kebab, Chinese food, hotpot, steamed buns, fried cakes, fried bread twists, parent's cooking
Color: Orange
Music: R&B
Cartoon: Donald Duck, Garfield
Fashion style: Casual
Role Model: Super Junior
Close celebrities: Super Junior's Kyuhyun

BAEKHYUN

Facts:
Stage name: Baekhyun
Role in EXO: Lead Vocals, Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: Byun Baekhyun
Nickname (given by his members): Bacon, Beef
Birthday: May 6, 1992
Birthplace: Bucheon, Gyeonggi Province, South Korea
Zodiac: Taurus
Height: 174 cm
Weight: 58 kg
Blood type: O
Super power (MAMA era): Light
Food: All
Number: 48
Color: Black, White, Grey
Hobby: Hapkido, playing piano, watching movies
Music: R&B, Pop, Punk Rock
Movie: Sci-fi fantasy, action movies
Motto: "Life is only a path full of efforts."
Fashion style: Tidily casual
Role Model: Rain
Close celebrities: Many

LAY

Facts:
Stage name: Lay
Role in EXO: Vocals, Lead Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: Zhang Yixing
Nickname (given by his members): Xing tuo, Xing Xing, Lay Unicorn
Birthday: October 7, 1991
Birthplace: Changsha, Hunan, China
Zodiac: Libre
Height: 177 cm
Weight: 60 kg
Blood type: A
Super power (MAMA era): Healing
Hobby: Composing songs
Food: Tidbits, junk foods, anything he cooks
Fashion style: Casual
Color: Purple, Black
Music: All
Role Model: BoA

XIUMIN

Facts:
Stage name: Xiumin
Role in EXO: Vocals, Dancer

Trivia:
Real name: Kim Minseok/ Jin Min Shuo
Nickname (given by his members): Bao Zi (Little Bun), Lil Fattie, King of Detail
Birthday: March 26, 1990
Birthplace: South Korea
Zodiac: Aries
Height: 173 cm
Weight: 60 kg
Blood type: B
Super power (MAMA era): Frost
Food: Steamed Buns, Kimchi soup and Miso soup prepared by his parents
Hobby: Playing soccer, exercising, cleaning, organizing, shopping
Color: Blue
Music: Ballad
Cartoon: Spongebob, Baby Huly
Fashion style: Casual
Role Model: Super Junior, JJ Lin
Close celebrities: f(x)'s Amber, and Super Junior's Henry