Friday, July 8, 2016
Ohhh Eym Gee..: A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL
Ohhh Eym Gee..: A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL: In love. Still in love with a guy whose heart does not contain my name anymore. Our love was a “hot and cold” love. It beca...
Wednesday, May 25, 2016
A TALE OF A SHATTERED GIRL
In love. Still in love with a guy whose heart does
not contain my name anymore.
Our love was a “hot and cold” love. It became hot when we
are in each other’s arms then cold when he’s far away. We live in a same town.
I knew him back when I was a high school student because I often saw him making
fun with his friends who are fortunately my acquaintances in our neighborhood. However, that time, I don’t have any feelings towards him. I don’t even know
his name. He is just a tall, skinny, and playful guy.
When I finished my secondary education, I decided to
pursue my college degree in Iloilo. I enjoyed my stay there and developed a
relationship that I thought would last for a lifetime with a marine guy. But
God never favored it and we ended our relationship after three years. I
thought I would not be able to recuperate my heart for a long time but.. surprise!, I became cheerful again after
two to three weeks.
It was mid-November 2010 when someone tried to converse
with me through Facebook. To my surprise, he was the same guy in our town. At
first, I don’t want to be his friend because he had the same course with my
recent “ex”. I tried to avoid him as much as possible until he stopped
communicating with me. I felt relief.
But..
He started contacting me after five months.
I really don’t want to talk with him! But he keeps on
insisting to have little talks with me until I decided to give him a chance.
After all, we’re of the same town and adding a new friend on my list is not
actually a bad idea. It started with small talks over the phone (because he is
studying in Davao that time and I am also preparing myself to enter law school)
until it became a routine of 11pm to 6am. Would you believe that? Haha.. But it’s
true. We never talked about love, commitments, and courtship. It’s anything
under the heat of the sun. I really saw him as my smart friend.
Until, he started opening his heart to me. He told me
that, unexpectedly, he fell in love with me. I was speechless. I was verbally
constipated. Haha.. But, I don’t have feelings for him! I don’t want to lose a
special friend. He matters. He courted me for two years. He patiently waited
for me for a long time. But that two years was my chance to see his other side.
He is so thoughtful. He never failed to contact me when he got a chance. At
that time, he was completing his “On the Job Training” in a how many nautical
miles. I never met him in person for that whole two years but was able to meet
his family.
Until
the day comes when we met for my panel interview where I was accepted as a law
student..
I
said, yes!
I
fall in love with a marine guy.. AGAIN.
Things
became hotter and happier. I felt love and care.
Until
he came back from his school to finish his studies..
Things
became colder and sadder. I felt hate and neglect.
Things
became different. He rarely talks with me. Reasons were he was busy or tired or
sleepy then next thing I know, he became a different person. I don’t know him
anymore. Gone is the guy I talked with a couple of hours until the rooster
crows in the morning. Gone is the guy who took great effort to make me smile.
At first, I became a fool. I am blinded by love. I made efforts to salvage our
love. But it’s hopeless when the other party does not appreciate your effort. I
never thought our love became messy. I was contented and confident that our
love has a strong foundation. Or so I thought. It became a one-sided love
affair.
After
27 months, I decided to let him go. I realized that I am a girl who doesn’t deserve
being an OPTION. It hurts! People said that it is more hurtful when a person
you love broke up with you. But why does it feel so wrong? I let him go. I
broke up with him! But why am I that person who feels this excruciating pain? I’ve
been hurting myself for two years already. In fact, I’ve been hurting since the
day I felt his love starting to fade. I love him so much that I let him go
because he is not happy with me anymore. I can feel it. Every. Single. Day.
I
decided to divert my attention to many activities. I tried everything so that I
could forget him even for a moment. I have been asking God for help. To stop
this madness. To stop this pain. I became dependent with God because I know He
is my Great Comforter but why does my mind comes to our memories?
You
know what’s the most crucial part of being in silence? That’s when I saw him
crying before we broke up. Why did he even bother to cry? I let him go. He should
be happy! Footspa naman o! What’s his
reason for crying? Is it because he betrayed me? Is it because he can’t let me
go but he had to for he doesn’t want to see me hurt anymore? Or am I that one
who hurt him? Or am I that one who doesn’t understand him? There are so many
questions that still linger in my head. I always end up thinking why he cried
that day before he said that he loves me but he had to let me go, too. I still
remember that last kiss he gave me, those tears he shed for me, those pain in
his eyes, those hugs that trembles and unsure, and those fake smiles that gave
me hint that he already left me a long time ago..
But,
I f*cking love him so much. So damn much that I don’t want to see him anymore!
I
am hurting but he is smiling.
I
am struggling but he is still smiling.
I
was the reason behind his smiles before until he can only force his smiles.
Then, later on, I am not the one who could make him smile anymore.
I
wish he knows how I can still manage to survive here after he broke me into
pieces. I wish he sees what he did to me. I wish he did not approach me when in
the end, he just left me.
God
knows I’ve done so hard to forget him but he never left my system. Fool.
Stupid. Weak. Helpless. Shattered.
Too.
Much. Pain.
Someone,
save me. Please.
Sunday, February 7, 2016
CIVIL PROCEDURE: DBP VS. CASTILLO (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 163827 August 17, 2011
MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: BARITUA VS MERCADER (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 136048 January 23, 2001
DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION
Generally. the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION
Generally. the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: BAGUNU VS. AGGABAO (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 186487 August 15, 2011
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under this doctrine, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under this doctrine, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPUBLIC VS ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 192975 November 12, 2012
HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 190107 June 6, 2011
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: FELIX VS. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 143736 August 11, 2004
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons on him, wither by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel.
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons on him, wither by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: ATTY. CABILI VS. JUDGE BALINDONG (Jurisprudence)
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 September 6, 2011
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
This doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
This doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 142628 February 6, 2007
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The Supreme Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The Supreme Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PEOPLE VS. AZARRAGA (Jurisprudence)
G.R. Nos. 187117 and 187127 October 12, 2011
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from the Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would be an inevitably result in delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from the Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would be an inevitably result in delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Tuesday, January 26, 2016
FAYPON VS QUIRINO
G.R. No. L-7068 December 22, 1954
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
Friday, January 22, 2016
GALLEGO VS VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641 November 24, 1941
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.
Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.
Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
DUMLAO, ET AL. VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
FACTS:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and has been receiving retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides that retirees from public office are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer's suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars person charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged. Dumlao's issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different issues. Further, this case does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
FACTS:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and has been receiving retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides that retirees from public office are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer's suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars person charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged. Dumlao's issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different issues. Further, this case does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Thursday, January 21, 2016
PAMIL VS TELERON
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
FACTS:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of the latter. He argued that under the Revised Administrative Code, "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RAC is no longer operative.
RULING:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of 8 which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.
Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
FACTS:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of the latter. He argued that under the Revised Administrative Code, "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RAC is no longer operative.
RULING:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of 8 which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.
Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
VILAR VS. PARAISO
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955
FACTS:
Vilar and Paraiso were candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was made, Paraiso was declared as the mayor duly elected. However, Vilar instituted a present quo warranto proceedings before the tial court contending that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of UCCP and that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place. The lower court favored Vilar but stated that the latter could not be declared as mayor. Both parties appealed before the CA. However, the court elevated it to the Supreme Court because of the conflicting issues between Vilar and Paraiso.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that Paraiso never ceased as minister and that the resignation he claimed to have filed before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. If the respondent intended to resign as minister of the religious organization for the purpose of launching his candidacy, he should resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation. who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to so. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
The documents Paraiso presented to show his alleged resignation were held to be self-serving and appeared to have been prepared haphazardly, leading the court to believe that these were made only to cure his ineligibility to hold office.
Wednesday, January 20, 2016
ROYALES VS IAC
G.R.
No. L-65072 January 31, 1984
FACTS:
Sought to be annulled in this petition for
review is a final and executory judgment rendered by the City Court [now
Metropolitan Trial Court] of Manila in Civil Case No. 057662-CV on ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Jose Planas, plaintiff
therein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process before the filing of the
case in court, as required by P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the
"Katarungang Pambarangay Law."
In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay conciliation process is a pre-condition for the filing of an action in court. There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact, respondent Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this condition precedent. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; 1 but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
FELIZARDO VS CA
G.R. No. 112050 June 15, 1994
FACTS:
The petitioner
averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support
his prayer for a preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to
evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 3 for prior barangay conciliation.
ISSUE:
Whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the
lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or judgment that could be reversed in
an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.
RULING:
Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law provides:
Sec. 412. Conciliation. —
(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
xxx xxx xxx
In
the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent
contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore,
ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
GALUBA VS LAURETA
G.R. No. 71091 January
29, 1988
FACTS:
The issue in this petition for review on
certiorari is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul an
amicable settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of the Lupong
Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of said amicable settlement
within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No.
1508.
RULING:
Pursuant to P.D.
1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which
were promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay
level, without judicial recourse," also provides that "[f]ailure to
repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits
respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.
Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for the annulment of an amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has repudiated the settlement in accordance with Section 13 as Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified, however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration award pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement.
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