G.R. No. 190107 June 6, 2011
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
Sunday, February 7, 2016
CIVIL PROCEDURE: FELIX VS. COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 143736 August 11, 2004
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons on him, wither by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel.
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IS ACQUIRED
The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons on him, wither by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: ATTY. CABILI VS. JUDGE BALINDONG (Jurisprudence)
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 September 6, 2011
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
This doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
This doctrine in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (Jurisprudence)
G.R. No. 142628 February 6, 2007
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The Supreme Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
The Supreme Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PEOPLE VS. AZARRAGA (Jurisprudence)
G.R. Nos. 187117 and 187127 October 12, 2011
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from the Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would be an inevitably result in delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY
At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from the Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would be an inevitably result in delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Tuesday, January 26, 2016
FAYPON VS QUIRINO
G.R. No. L-7068 December 22, 1954
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
Friday, January 22, 2016
GALLEGO VS VERRA
G.R. No. L-48641 November 24, 1941
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.
Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.
Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.
The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."
Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
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