FAYPON VS QUIRINO

G.R. No. L-7068                             December 22, 1954

FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.

RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

GALLEGO VS VERRA

G.R. No. L-48641                                  November 24, 1941

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.

Gallego is a native of Abuyog. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte.In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay, Bukidnon in a plantation of Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in September 1940.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for one and a half years.

Under the foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

RULING:
NO. In the definition of "residence"in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: (1) When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937; (2) His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election; (3) He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him; (4) He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government; and (5) He visited his family thrice despite the great distance between Leyte and Bukidnon.

The Court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to "exclude a stranger, or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community."

Moreover, the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.

DUMLAO, ET AL. VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52245                                January 22, 1980

FACTS:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and has been receiving retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides that retirees from public office are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer's suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars person charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged. Dumlao's issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different issues. Further, this case does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

PAMIL VS TELERON

G.R. No. L-34854                         November 20, 1978

FACTS:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of the latter. He argued that under the Revised Administrative Code, "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RAC is no longer operative.

RULING:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of 8 which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.

Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.

VILAR VS. PARAISO

G.R. No. L-8014                      March 14, 1955

FACTS:

Vilar and Paraiso were candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was made, Paraiso was declared as the mayor duly elected. However, Vilar instituted a present quo warranto proceedings before the tial court contending that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of UCCP and that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place. The lower court favored Vilar but stated that the latter could not be declared as mayor. Both parties appealed before the CA. However, the court elevated it to the Supreme Court because of the conflicting issues between Vilar and Paraiso.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that Paraiso never ceased as minister and that the resignation he claimed to have filed before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. If the respondent intended to resign as minister of the religious organization for the purpose of launching his candidacy, he should resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation. who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to so. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.

The documents Paraiso presented to show his alleged resignation were held to be self-serving and appeared to have been prepared haphazardly, leading the court to believe that these were made only to cure his ineligibility to hold office.

ROYALES VS IAC

G.R. No. L-65072                  January 31, 1984

FACTS:

Sought to be annulled in this petition for review is a final and executory judgment rendered by the City Court [now Metropolitan Trial Court] of Manila in Civil Case No. 057662-CV on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Jose Planas, plaintiff therein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process before the filing of the case in court, as required by P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law."

RULING: 
In disputes covered by P.D. 1508, as in the case at bar, the barangay conciliation process is a pre-condition for the filing of an action in court. There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the complaint, the case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. In fact, respondent Planas failed to allege in his complaint compliance with this condition precedent. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; 1 but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.

FELIZARDO VS CA

G.R. No. 112050                       June 15, 1994

FACTS: 

The petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support his prayer for a preliminary injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 3 for prior barangay conciliation.

ISSUE:

Whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

RULING:

Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides:  

Sec. 412. Conciliation. — 

(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: 

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.