New K-pop Aegyo Confession Song

Hi, K-popsters! Gwiyomi is a trend in social media. Many celebrities around the world had their different versions in expressing their aegyos through songs. Best examples are Girl's Generation (SNSD)’s Sunny, Yoona, and Sooyoung aegyos in a Weekly Idol episode. For those who are new to K-pop, Aegyo in Korean refers to a cute display of affection often expressed through a cute/baby voice, facial expressions, and gestures. Aegyo literally means behaving in a coquette-ish manner and is commonly expected for male and female K-pop idols to behave this way. Today, I just want to share the Hangul/Romanization lyrics and its English translation of this new trending aegyo confession song K-pop idols had been singing lately. Hope you will learn new Korean words even just a little of it. Enjoy learning!

Issjanh-a naega halmal-i iss-eo

있잖아 내가 할말이 있어

(Actually I have something to tell you)

Issjanh-a naega neolul joh-ahae

있잖아 내가 너를 좋아해

(Actually I like you..)

Imankeum, imankeum, imankeum, imankeum

이만큼 이만큼만큼 이만큼 이만큼

(This much, this much, this much, this much.. )

Naega neoleul salanhae

내가 너를 사랑해

(I love you.. )

To sing it simply:

Ijana nega halmari isso

Ijana nega nore jowahe

Imankum, imankum, imankum, imankum

Nega norul saranghe..

DIU VS CA

G.R. No. 115213               December 19, 1995

FACTS: 

Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the merits.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the confrontations before the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508.

RULING: 

In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were not sent to the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with said barangay chairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing the case in court.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

VINZONS VS CA

G.R. No. 111915               September 30, 1999

FACTS: 

The MTC of Daet rendered its decision ordering respondent to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals. On appeal to the RTC, the said decision was affirmed in toto. The CA, however, reversed the two (2) earlier decisions by dismissing the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, failure to comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (PD 1508); and lack of evidence of prior demand to vacate before instituting the complaint

RULING:  

We find that the MTC had improperly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment case under PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court. The Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should have been coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law.

VDA. DE BORROMEO vs. POGOY

G.R. No. L-63277               November 29, 1983

FACTS:

The intestate estate of Borromeo is the owner of a building, which was being rented out to petitioner. On a relevant date, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner for the payment of overdue rentals as well as to vacate the premises  thereafter. The petitioner failed to pay. With less than a year from the demand letter, private respondent instituted action against petitioner for unlawful detainer. Private respondent moves for the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction as she asserts that conciliation proceedings should have first been instituted with the Lupon Barangay.

HELD:

Even though the private respondent should have submitted the complaint before the Lupon, the petition should still be dismissed. The Lupon only refers to individuals—single human being contrasted with a social group or institution. It only applies to natural persons. In the case at bar, private respondent is only a nominal party in behalf of the intestate estate. The real party in interest is the intestate estate and thus, doesn't fall within the ambit of the provision requiring submission of the case to conciliation proceedings with the Lupon.

AGBAYANI VS BELEN

G.R. No. L-62339               October 27, 1983

FACTS:

Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge 1 dated September 28, 1983, dismissing the civil action instituted by said petitioners against private respondents and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving three (3) parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan. 2 The Court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss "on the ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their complaint with the Court.

RULING: 

Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or jurisdiction of the Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the "precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit in court. Hence, it was incorrect for the Trial Court to ascribe this obligation to them, and to dismiss their action for omission to fulfill it.

GEGARE vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83907               September 13, 1989

FACTS:

This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between the parties. But the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private respondent is happy with his half. This is the impasse that must be resolved. petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the appellate court to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for failure to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said case for one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.

RULING:

True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---

Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.

The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.

PEREZ vs. POMAR (G.R. No. L-1299, November 16, 1903)

I wish to digest the said case below, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. Thus:

Facts:

           The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the court to determine the amount due to him for the services he rendered in the Tabacalera Company and that the defendant Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment of damages amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the costs of suit. Prior to this event, the petitioner was asked to be an English interpreter between the defendant and the military authorities and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render his services to the respondent and that he obtained passes and accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of the towns in Province of Laguna( e.g conferences between the respondent and the colonel commanding the local garrison, conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, major in command in Pagsanjan about the shipment of goods from Manila) and that the plaintiff was assured by the respondent that in every rendered service to the said company, there would be such payment. Thus, caused him to abandon his soap business and suffered damages in the sum of $3,200. The defendant filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the allegations stated by the petitioner. He also stated that Perez borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175 for his soap business, that Perez purposes in accompanying him is to extend his business and mercantile relations,  free transportation, and that Perez had acted as interpreter of his own free will without any offer of payment and therefore no legal relation between them existed.

Issue:

       Whether or not  the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner.

Held:

       Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.

Ratio:

         The Court ruled out that  if there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract. When one party knowingly receives something for nothing, the courts may impose a quasi contract. Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an agreement. Instead, an arrangement is imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust enrichment. On the services rendered by the petitioner  in the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the  defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his rendition of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code, Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The fact that the defendant consented to accept an interpreter's services on various occasions, rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is  just that he should pay the reasonable payment because it is well-known principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.